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Owning Computer Associates BrightStor through Mailslots
Recall from blog/2006-07-11 and TSRT-06-02 that any code relying on the implicit message size limitation of Second-class Mailslots could be exposing a vulnerability. I mentioned that the rare usage of Mailslots will severely mitigate the impact of this new "class" of vulnerability. The fact that no Mailslot bugs have emerged since the initial disclosure is evidence that my assumption was true. The one 3rd party exposure I have personally come across was just disclosed today: CA BrightStor Discovery Service Mailslot Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. The exposed Mailslot name is 'CheyenneDS' and a no explicit MaxMessageSize is supplied in the call to CreateMailslot, an attacker can cause an exploitable stack-based buffer overflow. Here is the creation of the Mailslot: Later the mailslot handle is read from into a 4k buffer. The read data is also passed to a routine which calls vsprintf into a 1k buffer. One would imagine that at least one other instance of a Mailslot handling bug must exist elsewhere. Anyone? Comments
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